Dr. Parla Onuk¹
Dr. Faculty Member, Istanbul Nişantaşı University, Department of Economics and Finance – TÜRKİYE

Source picture: The Right to Resist II, Created with AI,

Türkiye has recently begun testing the highest levels in its history, with external debt exceeding $500 billion. Meanwhile, the inability to reduce inflation to the desired levels, along with the rising cost of living, has led people to draw a pessimistic picture of the future of the Turkish economy. In this article, I will explain Türkiye’s historical struggle with external debt and offer some insights into what lies ahead for the country. Let’s begin.

The year is 1978… Türkiye was facing difficult economic times with a heavy external debt burden. Foreign goods had become scarce, and factories were operating at low capacity due to constant power cuts. The IMF quickly stepped in, and on July 19, 1979, a new stand-by agreement was signed, which converted the debts originating from Foreign Currency Convertible Deposit (FCC) accounts into public debt and deferred them for seven years. Indeed, one of the key instruments that contributed to the rise in debt during this period was the FCC accounts. Introduced for the first time in 1967, this system was designed to allow the government to obtain foreign currency, while the private sector could secure loans.

Under this system, individuals or institutions that deposited foreign currency into FCC accounts could, if they wished, withdraw their money along with interest in foreign currency or in Turkish lira (TRY) at the prevailing exchange rate of the day. These accounts held in banks were essentially deposit accounts in Turkish lira but backed by foreign currency. With the inflow of funds, banks used these accounts to provide loans to private individuals and entities in the domestic market. There was no currency risk for the banks, as the government had guaranteed the exchange rate. In essence, banks acted as intermediaries for external financing of Turkish companies, with the government providing the guarantee for these deposits²

The January 24, 1980 Decisions, which followed the Stand-by Agreement, represented a transformation of debtor countries under the guise of neoliberalism, a model that would later be imposed on Mexico and other indebted countries. These decisions signaled the contraction of the public sector, the privatization of stateowned enterprises (SOEs), liberalization of foreign trade and capital markets, and tax reductions, all of which drastically altered Türkiye’s economic landscape.

The imposed privatization policies became the sole solution offered by creditor countries for those nations engulfed by debt crises in the 1980s. The economic stagnation in developed countries could be mitigated through new investment opportunities, while stocks from debtor countries could be purchased to guarantee debt repayment. This indeed came to pass. In Türkiye’s case, within the framework of privatization, the living conditions of the working class were deliberately worsened to reduce internal costs. Wages rapidly eroded against the backdrop of inflation. Moreover, following the military regime in September 1980, a new rentier class was created under state authority. As a result, income distribution deteriorated sharply. .

The IMF has continued to play this new role it assumed in the 1980s with the same consistency up to the present day. Whenever a country is plunged into a debt crisis, it almost acts as a „supreme authority,“ intervening in the financial affairs of debtor nations and imposing austerity policies. This is because the IMF believes that debtor countries mismanage the loans they have taken and are driven into crisis due to reasons specific to their internal dynamics. As a result, the IMF does not hesitate to impose sanctions on these „incompetent“ countries. It is this very mindset that I have sought to criticize in my book. If this article interests you, you may want to read The Debt Spiral: The Political Economy of External Debt. The book focuses on the transformation of capital from the 1800s onward, exploring the power relations between countries that have shaped the global economic landscape. It discusses the significance of external debt within this context, offering the reader an opportunity to „surf“ through history using country examples to better understand this relationship. Türkiye is analyzed in a separate chapter.

The main aim of this book is to dismantle the justifications that the IMF has imposed upon countries, subsequently shaping national economies under the pretext of these policies, and to explain how debtor countries have been inexorably driven into crises by external dynamics. In the remainder of this article, I will describe Türkiye’s experience in order to illustrate this asymmetric structure. Now, let’s continue.

To understand the political and economic turbulence that Türkiye was plunged into during the 1980s, it is useful to look at the broader context. In the 1980s, Türkiye was not alone in facing a debt crisis; many countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa, also found themselves in the same situation. Indeed, statistical data shows that foreign capital flows to these countries were at high levels during the 1970-81 period. Moreover, these same countries declared defaults on their debts just a year or two apart. In other words, debtor countries were suddenly and heavily indebted by creditors in a very short period, and soon after, these countries were thrown into crisis. This indicates that there are countries that shared the same fate in terms of high borrowing and the crisis process. Therefore, we can argue that global common dynamics played a significant role in these events. Now, let’s briefly discuss the developments of the period.

The 1950s and 1960s offer significant clues regarding developments in the real sector and the process of capital formation. During these years, the rapid economic growth in developed countries, led by the United States, was particularly striking. Looking at the factors behind this growth rate, it can be said that technological innovations and the activities of multinational corporations were highly influential. The pioneering industrial sectors of the 1920s became the driving forces behind the technological innovations of this period. The automobile industry was one of the most prominent examples of this. With Fordist production methods targeting the middle class, the manufacturing sector became one of the key factors contributing to the increase in global capital. As this sector developed, trade among core countries gradually accelerated the accumulation of capital. At the same time, with the monetary system established by the United States, international activities proceeded almost seamlessly. However, this picture began to crack in the 1970s. Overproduction, a result of the capitalist system, eventually led to a decrease in profit rates in developed countries. Along with the global threat of inflation and the collapse of the existing monetary system, several problems began to arise. The year 1970 marked the lowest point for the U.S. economy. To overcome the stagnation, turning towards peripheral countries became almost a necessity. It was in this environment that the oil crisis erupted. As a result of this crisis, the funds held by oil-exporting countries combined with the global liquidity that had long flowed into London, creating a massive accumulation of funds ready for export. This accumulation lowered real interest rates and led to heavy borrowing by peripheral countries during the 1970-81 period. This borrowing, which spanned almost every country in the world, from Latin America to Asia, Europe, and Africa, was unprecedented at that time. Commercial banks were the key players in creating this bubble. They not only exported funds but also diversified debt instruments, offering countries a wide range of borrowing options. However, due to rising interest rates in the U.S. (the Volcker Shock), cuts in international liquidity, and falling export revenues, countries with increasing debt loads eventually faced debt service problems. Towards the end of the 1970s, the crisis, which had already been signaled in Europe, became evident in 1982 when Mexico defaulted on its debt. Many other countries also declared bankruptcy soon after. During this crisis period, which included Türkiye, the IMF presented the same set of prescriptions to every country. However, these countries had been suddenly burdened with debt in a short time due to the stagnation in developed countries, and, influenced by the dynamics in the core countries (such as high interest rates and cuts in international liquidity), they were quickly plunged into crisis. Therefore, it can be concluded that the debt-credit relationship at this time was primarily shaped by external, rather than internal, dynamics of the debtor countries.

Now, let’s turn to the 1994 and 2001 crises… The first of these two debt crises, the 1994 crisis, can be entirely attributed to the incompetence of the government at the time. In contrast, analyses of the 2001 crisis tend to acknowledge the influence of external dynamics. Firstly, statistical data reveals that between 1990 and 1996, there were large-scale capital movements worldwide. What shaped this flow of capital? A similar scenario to the one in the 1980s was at play. Behind these massive capital flows was again a technological innovation, this time in the telecommunications and information technology sectors. In order to foster these advancements, governments played a significant role in reducing the costs in the manufacturing sector. The measures against labor in the U.S., which later spread to Europe, pressured wages for many years, thus helping to reduce manufacturing costs. Additionally, as a result of changes in the production model, labor-intensive sectors were shifted to peripheral countries, further lowering costs and focusing on the production of high value- added products. This restructuring allowed for significant advances in telecommunications and information technology. The role of the state in shaping this production model was crucial for facilitating technological innovation. The years that followed would witness a reshaping of the global economy around this massive capital accumulation driven by these innovations.

Indeed, this is what happened. The Plaza Accord, which kept the dollar value low, boosted U.S. export revenues. Naturally, this also led to an increase in capital accumulation. Even more importantly, countries like Japan and Germany, whose currencies appreciated against the dollar, lowered interest rates and adopted expansionary monetary policies to stimulate the economy, which further fueled liquidity growth. When similar policies were seen in the U.S., capital exports to peripheral countries picked up pace. Latin America managed to capture a large share of the global capital inflows until 1994. However, the debt crisis in Mexico redirected capital flows towards East and Southeast Asia, and even to the countries of the former Soviet Union. Mexico’s debt crisis was largely averted with a short-term intervention by the IMF, and capital continued to flow uninterrupted to other countries. As was seen in the 1980s, this led to widespread borrowing once again.

The attractive interest rates offered by peripheral countries led them to peg their currencies to the dollar in order to attract foreign capital amidst the external economic conditions. This move rapidly increased their debt levels within a short time frame. However, the growth in debt did not only increase their dependency on the core economies, but also significantly heightened their economic vulnerability. The subsequent devaluation of the dollar, resulting from what is known as the „Reverse Plaza Accord,“ turned into a disaster for debtor countries. As export revenues quickly declined, these countries struggled to service their debts in the face of a rising dollar. Furthermore, the U.S. decision to raise interest rates curtailed foreign investment, pushing these countries into a deep economic crisis. The liquidity squeeze, coupled with mounting debt burdens, led to a wave of bankruptcies among companies. The debt crisis in Asia in 1997 and 1998 rapidly spread globally, with Russia, Latin America, and South Africa also feeling the impact. Türkiye, once again, experienced the consequences of this global trend, with crises occurring first in 1994 and then in 2001.

In the 1980s, the Turkish economy was dragged into a period marked by the abandonment of the import substitution model through the January 24th Decisions and the acceleration of privatization. During the first decade of this process, significant steps were taken towards these objectives. The 1980-1983 period, under military rule, was characterized by trade liberalization. At the same time, the public sector’s borrowing needs were significantly reduced. Later, during civilian administration from 1984 to 1987, further trade reforms were supported  Moreover, in 1989, as part of an inflation- control program, tariffs were substantially reduced. By the time 1990 arrived, almost all quantitative and price restrictions had been lifted. The backbone of Özal’s policies was centered around exports. Significant steps were taken to ensure that goods subject to export would strongly compete in the international arena. To achieve this, a policy was implemented in which firms with specific financial qualifications and sales capacities would collect products from the domestic market and direct them towards export, rather than firms exporting on their own account. However, this policy worked at the disadvantage of the main producers and to the benefit of a few export firms. Large intermediary export firms, which took a major share of export revenues, inflated their intermediary profits, putting the primary producers in a difficult position. Nevertheless, it can be said that this policy led to some progress in exports. However, it was clear that the goal of permanently closing the current account deficit had not been achieved.

The sole innovation was, of course, not limited to foreign trade. The liberalization of the capital account was another priority, which was gradually implemented. Starting in 1984, Turkish citizens were allowed to hold deposits in foreign currencies. Subsequently, the process of capital account liberalization was completed over the next two years, beginning in 1988. Capital flows in external accounts were fully liberalized. This, as was the case in many peripheral countries, quickly led to rising interest rates. Additionally, the exchange rate revaluation in 1989, along with tariff reductions that were implemented, resulted in a sharp increase in imports, leading to a deterioration of the trade balance in 1990. In summary, this decade left uncontrolled capital movements and external imbalances as a legacy for the following period. Indeed, as a share of GNP, the trade deficit was 3% in 1992, but by the following year, it had increased to 8.5%.

Foreign trade deficits, which had already been chronic since the previous periods, were further reinforced with the arrangements made under the name of liberalization. In this context, the country accumulated a significant debt burden from the early 1990s until the 1994 crisis. This debt burden mainly originated from domestic debt. Nevertheless, the public sector also resorted to domestic borrowing due to the lack of sufficient external resources.

We can say that in the 1990-94 period, in addition to public debt, relatively private debt was also on the rise. Furthermore, it is observed that domestic debt was higher than external debt from 1992 onwards. During this period, the deterioration in the public sector accounts is quite remarkable. The total public deficit, consolidated budget deficit and total budget expenditures to GDP ratios have reached extraordinary levels.³

The questions that need to be asked within this context are why the state resorted mainly to domestic borrowing at a time when global capital was abundant, why it could not borrow more in 1994 and was plunged into control currency and maturity mismatches were not being followed. As the banking sector’s open positions increased as a result of the interruption of foreign funds, they sought to increase their liquidity even more. As Demirbank, which owns about 10 percent of GDS (Government Domestic Debt Securities), started to sell these securities, interest rates increased and foreigners holding GDS also sold them. Meanwhile, the borrowing needs of state-owned banks with high levels of short-term debt also led to an increase in interest rates.

As interest rates increased rapidly, the value of bonds in risky positions on the balance sheets of banks burdened with short-term debt began to decline over time. Facing liquidity constraints, banks resorted to selling government bonds. This situation reinforced the risk perception of foreigners and caused their outflows to accelerate. Indeed, this move pushed interest rates even higher. CBRT, on the other hand, resisted intervening for a long time due to the agreement with the IMF. Then it stepped in and offered additional liquidity to the market. However, it was too late.

When we reached February 2001, intense capital outflows as well as polemics between the prime minister and the president accelerated the process leading to the crisis. Interest rates reached levels not seen until then, and reserves were greatly reduced. Unable to maintain the fixed exchange rate any longer, CBRT was forced to leave the exchange rate fluctuating on February 21.

,The cost of the crisis was heavy. The economy contracted by around 8 percent. Inflation has exceeded 70 percent and millions of people have become unemployed. The domestic and external debt burden has increased considerably due to the level of interest rates. The IMF considered this to be the result of political instability and a series of technical mistakes, and blamed Türkiye for it. But before the crisis, the IMF was involved in the country’s financial management. This was seen as a minor detail and a new agreement was signed with Türkiye. In this context, the total amount received from the IMF in the 1999-2003 period reached 20.4 billion dollars. In return, a series of privatization and economic austerity policies were imposed.

In reality, the debt journey was always the same. During periods of abundant capital in the external conjuncture, there is a rapid transfer to the periphery, usually through banking channels, but funds are predominantly short-term due to uncertainties in the periphery. In this context, with the funds they obtain, banks extend loans in TL in the domestic market, creating a large bubble under maturity discrepancies. As this bubble grows, the exchange rate risk increases over time. The system is actually fed by external funds. When central countries start raising interest rates, the situation is suddenly reversed. Peripheral countries, unable to find funds, are plunged into crisis one by one. This is what indebted peripheral countries, including Türkiye, are experiencing.

Let us now consider the process of the Turkish economy after 2001. When we analyze the statistical data on the world economy, we observe that there were high capital flows to peripheral countries in the 2002-2007 period⁴ The 2002-2007 borrowing period was an important period in which peripheral countries accumulated high debts due to low interest rates in the US and then, like dominoes, were dragged into crises. In this phase, Türkiye stepped into a new phase in its debt journey with the impact of the change in the political arena. This period was such that the economy was growing rapidly under high indebtedness and budget deficits were reaching the point of collapse. In these years, Türkiye, like other peripheral countries, benefited from the external conjuncture, but was again hit hard by the global liquidity crunch following the outbreak of the 2008 mortgage crisis.

Behind the 2002-2007 borrowing period were again developments in the central countries. Indeed, for foreign capitals seeking a safe haven after the losses they suffered in the 1990s in debtor countries, the US, which has made rapid technological breakthroughs in the IT sector in recent years, was a very attractive option. For this reason, funds quickly flowed to the US, especially to the stock market, led by technology stocks. Therefore, stock prices reached very high levels. But this boom in asset prices was quite independent of the rate of profitability in the real sector. Because profits had fallen relatively in 1997 due to the effect of the rising dollar and the Asian crisis. In this context, the authorities chose to turn a blind eye to the growing stock bubble. Because they believed that the increase in asset prices would trigger a revival in the real sector. As a matter of fact, things went well until early 2000. However, this mind-boggling rise in tech stocks had reached its natural limit. Soon the dot-com bubble burst and the situation were turned upside down in an instant. With the beginning of the recession, Greenspan, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, found the solution in lowering interest rates and expanding the money supply. With this move, the Fed attempted to counter the negative effects of the asset bubble with a new bubble. This effort also paved the way for a new era of high indebtedness as capital flowed to the periphery.

There was no problem for borrower countries as long as interest rates remained low at the center. Although the uninterrupted credit flow has created significant economic advantages, the increase in debt burdens has been their biggest disadvantage. Indeed, the bursting of the other asset bubble, the mortgage bubble, in 2008 was a precursor of hard times for indebted countries. European indebted countries in particular, which had difficulties in finding capital over time, made the world agenda with their troubles. In the global crisis, high interest rates in Europe have become a disaster for peripheral countries burdened by heavy debt. Countries trapped in a spiral of short-term debt, unable to find funds, have turned to rescue packages.

In the meantime, Türkiye was dealing with internal conflicts. First of all, the public blamed the coalition governments for the 2001 crisis, which was both economically and politically chaotic, and gave power to the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power for 23 years. While the 2001 crisis was still echoing, a year later the newly established AKP came to power alone in the general elections. Therefore, it was inevitable that the party that had managed to hold on to its seat for so long would take on the mission of being the main driver and main responsible for the economic trajectory. As a result of the privatization and financial market liberalization policies adopted, the country faced the highest capital inflow in its history and opened the doors to a new era of foreign capital cooperation.

When the AKP came to power, it inherited the „Strong Development Model“ program initiated in 2001 by Kemal Derviş. This was a flexible exchange rate system, and the aim was to restructure and strengthen the capital of the banking and financial sectors. The AKP faithfully implemented this plan. In this context, some public banks were privatized, while others were merged. With exchange rate adjustments and the suppression of the budget, the policy of achieving a primary surplus was adopted, and efforts were made to create a secure market for international goods. However, Türkiye’s inflation and budget deficit problems were not due to high interest rates or a large debt stock but stemmed from the structure and functioning of the real economy. The production mechanism was highly inefficient, and as a result, when savings could not be generated from this sector, channels for foreign trade and the public sector could not be adequately funded. Consequently, the current account deficit and budget deficit became structural problems, leading to an inevitable and unrelenting demand for foreign capital.

It is possible to say that Türkiye attracted significant foreign capital until 2005, with portfolio investments being higher during this period. Additionally, the capital entering debt securities was also quite high. However, in 2005, with the US’s decision to raise interest rates, portfolio investments sharply declined. On the other hand, direct foreign investments saw a significant increase. This rise was significantly influenced by the growing seriousness of relations with the EU and the initiation of accession negotiations. However, these inflows were not new investments per se, but rather primarily took the form of acquisitions, partnerships, or real estate investments. The weak banking sector showed considerable improvement as a result. Yet, these inflows should be evaluated from two perspectives. The first is whether these inflows generated foreign exchange earnings in a country with a high current account deficit. Although these investments initially brought in foreign exchange earnings, they did not lead to any long-term profitability. For example, in 2005, 93% of direct foreign investments were directed towards real estate and services, sectors that do not generate foreign exchange. The second perspective is examining the impact of these inflows on domestic capital. The closure of many SOEs that produced locally via privatization and the complete transfer of production to foreign capital raises serious questions about how much this has contributed to Türkiye’s development goals.

Since 2004, while the public sector’s debt burden as a share of GDP decreased, the private sector’s debt increased rapidly. By today, the gap has widened significantly. With the inflow of foreign capital, Türkiye achieved

high growth rates between 2004 and 2007. The increase in foreign debt was accompanied by relatively low levels of domestic debt. Inflation also significantly decreased, and the budget deficit followed a favorable trend. Although the current account deficit had reached relatively low levels in 2002, it continued to rise until 2008. However, for a country whose foreign debt is increasing, the continued rise in the current account deficit represents a serious issue. As observed in previous periods, for a country unable to repay its foreign debt with its own currency, this trend creates dependence on foreign debt, leading to a vicious cycle of borrowing to service the existing debt. Any potential capital outflow could prove disastrous for the country. In such a situation, where the current account deficit does not decrease and debts continue to rise, these vulnerabilities are inevitable. In this context, it can be said that Türkiye has been drawn into the aforementioned situation.

Despite this situation, unemployment, the country’s other burning issue, has remained high, albeit declining slightly in recent years. The reason for this was largely the privatization of agricultural SOEs, the loss of employment in the agricultural sector with the end of support payments and subsidies in agriculture, and the inability of other sectors to adequately compensate for this loss.

The outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis drastically changed the situation for peripheral countries like Türkiye. The high interest rates maintained within the European Union led to a rapid shift of capital from the periphery to the center. Within a few years, major debt crises erupted. Greece, as discussed, was a particularly significant case, both due to the sanctions imposed after the crisis and the deep recession the country experienced. Türkiye, however, did not face debt levels as high as Greece. Additionally, unlike banks in the US and Europe, there were no derivative products in Türkiye, and mortgage loans were virtually nonexistent. However, both the foreign debt of banks and firms in the real sector were substantial. When the crisis erupted, both foreign direct investment and portfolio investments sharply decreased, causing the GDP to rapidly shrink and even show negative growth in the following year.⁵

Between 2002 and 2007, Türkiye went through a period of large-scale privatizations, with a significant influx of capital due to the favorable external environment, including approximately $44 billion in support from the IMF, and an overvalued Turkish lira resulting from the excess of foreign currency. During this period, the public sector was able to access more resources than ever before. However, this situation was not sustainable in the long term. Continuously relying on privatization to finance the budget deficit and perpetually increasing foreign borrowing to sustain the current account deficit at these levels was not viable. Indeed, things began to turn around with the eruption of the 2008 mortgage crisis. In 2008 and 2009, economic performance followed a significantly negative trajectory. However, from that point onward, the US Federal Reserve’s decision to bring interest rates close to zero prompted new capital inflows into Türkiye.

Under these conditions, Türkiye was able to increase its portfolio investments until 2012. Concurrently, the private sector’s debt load rapidly escalated. However, after a while, expectations of an interest rate hike and the relatively improving economic performance in the US led to a sharp decline in capital inflows. By 2015, with the interest rate hike, capital inflows even turned negative. After this, due to expectations that the Fed would not raise interest rates quickly, there was another significant inflow of capital. However, after 2017, when interest rates were increased again, foreign capital inflows decreased once more. Then, the pandemic struck, and interest rates were lowered again. Now, with the global threat of inflation, we have entered another tightening period. This has become a vicious cycle where the country’s economy fluctuates in response to decisions made by the Federal Reserve. Particularly in terms of inflation, the country has seen a significant surge in the last three years. Foreign capital inflows, however, have remained insufficient.

With its current situation in terms of the dollar, Türkiye continues to depend on foreign capital. It appears that with such high debt levels, a large current account deficit, and a growth model fueled by domestic consumption expenditures, the country is rapidly heading into a debt spiral. Given its more vulnerable structure compared to the past, and with core economies tightening their monetary policies today, it would not be incorrect to say that Türkiye is facing even more challenging times ahead.

To avoid debt crises, it is, of course, possible to take preventive measures through reforms. However, for Türkiye, simply lowering interest rates and attempting to revive the construction sector would not be sufficient to avert a potential crisis. The reason is that construction is a one-off investment, and once it is completed, unlike industrial investments, it ceases to have a productive, income-generating effect. Ultimately, while it may lead to a temporary increase in production, it creates significant long-term costs for society, as it does not generate sustainable employment.

Another critical issue is the state’s withdrawal from capital investments, adopting the build-operate-transfer (BOT) or public-private partnership (PPP) model, and, as a result, relying on foreign capital for infrastructure investments. Such investments should be financed directly from the state budget. This is because providing income guarantees to foreign firms for the construction of natural monopoly-type facilities essentially means paying extraordinary sums to foreign firms in sectors where no profit should be expected or covering the interest in the borrowed money. This, undoubtedly, creates an unfair burden on society.

Additionally, a portion of production is transferred to foreign producers due to the high-interest rate regime, which leads to job losses and, consequently, increased unemployment. Furthermore, the proportion of newly graduated, educated unemployed individuals is steadily rising in Türkiye. The primary dilemma facing Türkiye is how to provide employment for this young and growing population while simultaneously ensuring sustainable growth through technological advancement. A key step in addressing this issue would be to shift investments towards hightech sectors, produce high value-added goods, and export them to the international market. To achieve this, during periods of low interest rates in core countries and the associated capital flow processes, it is crucial to regulate capital movements through counter- cyclical policies. The government must implement incentive policies to ensure that these incoming resources are channeled into investments. Additionally, during such periods, tax policies should be put in place to prevent increased dependence on imported goods in consumption. It must be remembered that these periods of cheap capital do not last forever. Once these steps are taken, falling into a debt crisis will no longer be an inevitable fate for Türkiye.

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* AI was utilised in the writing of this article.