Hüseyin Ozan Uyumlu
ozan4477@gmail.com – TURKEY

External indebtedness is the process by which a state or a public organization obtains revenue from various external sources. Indebtedness can also be defined as the dependence of the borrowing country on the lending country. (Şeker, 2007, p. 115-134). Increased external debt makes countries dependent on creditor countries. The period between 1854 and 1923 was a period in which the Ottoman Empire borrowed intensively from Western countries and gradually became a colonial empire. The Ottoman Empire paid the price of external debts by giving up its independence and territories (Dikmen, 2010, p. 137).

The economic structure of the Ottoman Empire, which had been dependent on foreign countries since the 19th century, was abandoned due to the Republic of Turkey’s prioritization of economic independence, but the situation was reversed again in the 1950s due to various political reasons (Keçeligil, 2019, p. 103). The strict relationship between indebtedness and external dependence normalizes the expectation of both economic and political interests of states or institutions that provide debt financing. For this reason, while analyzing the issue of borrowing and the General Debts Administration, an evaluation will be made in its economic and political context.

The economic situation of the Ottoman Empire began to worsen as a result of the consequences of the mercantilist economic system that emerged with the Age of Exploration reaching the Ottoman Empire. After the geographical explorations, world trade over the oceans gained momentum. This situation caused a decrease in the revenues of states that dominated traditional trade routes, such as the Ottoman Empire (Yüksel, 2020, p. 24). The precious metals flowing to Europe entered the Ottoman Empire, leading to an abundance of money in the market, and the continuous increase in government expenditures caused the country’s economy to be dragged into a rapid inflation environment (Keçeligil, 2019, p. 112-113). With the effect of price increases and due to the difficulties affecting the economy, taxes, which are the largest source of revenue, have become nominally inflexible against price changes, resulting in a significant decrease in treasury revenues (Eser, 2021, p. 35). Ottoman Empire encountered the phenomenon of „inflation“ for the first time during the reign of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror, which is seen as one of the most politically powerful periods of the state (Shaw, 1994, p. 96).

The Ottoman Empire, postponing the crisis through military victories despite the enrichment of its rivals and the change in the economic parameters in the country from the 15th century onwards, realized the problems as of the 17th century and tried to make improvements in the economy and military order by introducing reforms. Despite the resistance, cutting palace expenditures was one of the most important economic reforms. The Ottoman Empire, which did not close its borders to imports due to its understanding of “provisionism”1 one of the three economic principles of the state, began to surrender to global capital. The Ottoman Empire first turned to „domestic“ capital to get out of the financial crisis and started domestic borrowing in 1775 with the practice called „esham„. This practice also laid the foundation for the use of banknotes.

In the late 18th century, Ottoman finances were facing a major crisis due to the defeats in wars and the reparations paid. When war broke out in 1787 with Russia, one of the most powerful states of the century, the Ottoman government turned to domestic borrowing by the state in order to cover the costs of the war, but was unable to raise as much money as it wanted. Subsequently, he tried to borrow money from the Netherlands and Spain, but could not reach an agreement (Yüksel, 2020, p. 125).

It can be argued that before the Ottoman Empire’s borrowing situation, the capitulation practices made the Ottoman economy open to external factors. Capitulations granted to European states did not pose a problem when the feudal mode of production was generally observed in the world and the Ottoman Empire was economically strong, but the expansion of capitulations in the eighteenth century and the capitalist mode of production that emerged after the Industrial Revolution in Europe turned the capitulations into a Trojan horse placed in the Ottoman country. During the 19th century, Britain and then other European countries gradually established imperialist control over the Ottoman Empire in parallel with their growing accumulation of capitalist wealth (Öztürk and Keskin, 2011, 118). The capitulations not only prevented the adoption of customs protection measures, but also shattered the traditional production structure and started the process of collapse of the domestic industry (Yıldız, 2007, p 116). The Ottoman Empire was transformed into a more dependent country with these regulations and was condemned to an economic system that melted into the wheels of capitalism. This economic system has completely turned the state into a semi-colony of capitalism (Eser, 2021, p. 40).

The Industrial Revolution, first seen in England in the late 18th century, changed the course of world history. European states, particularly Britain, started to produce with machines in factories, enabling the production of a new model commodity at a cheaper price. Even though the Ottoman Empire made attempts to industrialize, reforms remained stalled because it did not have a holistic structure. The Ottoman Empire, unable to have competence in the fields of education and science due to reasons such as the removal of science courses from madrasas from the 17th century onwards, the disallowance of the studies of scientists such as Hezarfen Ahmet Çelebi, Lagari Hasan Çelebi, Takiyüddin Mehmed and the exile of some of them, could not provide the scientific and technological infrastructure, which is one of the basic building blocks of industrialization.

The Industrial Revolution created the need for raw materials and markets in the world. Industrializing countries have looked for ways to find large markets to sell the commercial goods they produce in abundance. The Ottoman Empire was considered an appealing market for European states as it was one of the countries with the largest population of the period. When we look at the indicators of the Ottoman Empire’s integration with the world economy that emerged in the 19th century, the primary event that draws attention is foreign trade agreements (Yıldız, 2011, p. 319). The Balta Liman Trade Agreement signed with Britain in 1838 is one of the most unfavorable treaties in the history of Ottoman diplomacy. The Balta Liman Trade Agreement introduced the rule of a very low and uniform tax on goods coming from the UK to the Ottoman Empire. Britain’s import rate to the Ottoman Empire was 19.0% between 1830-1832, while this rate increased to 29.3% between 1840-1842 after the trade agreement. In other words, there was a sudden growth of 10%. (Yıldız, 2007, p. 118). In 23 years, Turkey’s imports from the Britain increased by more than 400% in value terms, while Turkey’s share in total British exports rose from 1.9% to 4.9% (Kurmuş, 2007, p. 86). The same privileges granted to England were granted to all large and small European states within a year (Keçeligil, 2019, p. 113). As a result of the trade agreements signed with European states, there is an increase in the amount and composition of foreign capital entering the country (Yıldız, 2007, s. 117). The Treaty not only made the foreign trade tax nominal, but also amended the internal trade tax. Local merchants had to pay the 8% internal trade fee, but it was abolished for European merchants (Yıldız, 2007, p. 117). Goods produced cheaply in Europe were unloaded at Ottoman ports by paying very low taxes and transported to various markets of the country without paying domestic trade tax. European commercial goods, which were sold cheaper in the market than Ottoman domestic goods, forced local tradesmen to close their businesses, and Ottoman domestic production came to an end. For example, before 1847, 32,000 kg of silk was produced on a thousand weaving looms in Bursa, but with the entry of European goods into the country, only 75 weaving looms remained in Bursa and annual production dropped to 5200 kilograms (Yıldız, 2007, p. 117). The Ottoman country was dominated by foreign goods. The money of the Ottoman citizens went out of the country through consumption, and the Ottoman Empire became dependent on foreign sources. The period 1838-1864 was a time when the Ottoman economy was completely opened to foreign influences through trade and financial agreements and turned into an open market. In this period, economic imperialism dominated the Ottoman economy in all its dimensions. With this treaty, the economic exploitation of the Ottoman Empire, which had been going on for many years, was legalized in the international arena (Yıldız, 2007, s. 117).

Another significance of the 1838-Baltalimanı Free Trade Agreement for Ottoman society was that it enabled the introduction of capitalist relations of production into the Ottoman homeland. The capitalist system of Western Europe entered and settled in the country first as „trade capital“ and then, after 1854, as „financial capital“ (Keçeligil, 2019, p. 115). The entrepreneur who invests his capital has the most important objective of making a profit. Although the main objective here is profit, there are some factors that foreign capital pays attention to when making its investments. The market attractiveness of the country in which the investment will be made comes first in the preferences of foreign capital. In other words, excess demand in a country is of great importance. Another factor is the abundance and cheapness of production factors and natural resources. One of the important issues that the entrepreneur who invests his capital pays attention to is the economic and political stability of the country in which he will invest (Yıldız, 2007, p. 115). The establishment of the General Debts Administration was influenced by the desire of the European capital power, which entered the Ottoman Empire effectively after the Balta Liman Trade Treaty, to ensure the „economic stability“ of the Ottoman Empire and to make decisions in line with its interests. Economic stability means „manageable“ resources for European capital, guaranteeing property rights, enabling foreigners to acquire immovable property and increasing transportation facilities (Kurmuş, 2007, p. 71).

European states, enriched after the Industrial Revolution, started to lend money to countries in economic distress in the second half of the 19th century. As the debts continued, European capital poured into these countries and they were almost colonized.

Countries incur extraordinary expenditures to finance losses from extraordinary events such as wars and natural disasters. Extraordinary events can greatly increase public expenditures, and if domestic resources are insufficient for public expenditures, external resources are used (Dursun, p. 27). The Ottoman Empire was obliged to use external debt for the first time in 1854 as a result of the increased expenditures caused by the Crimean War that started in 1853. What is critical here is that before this loan was taken, in other words, from the 1840s onwards, European capital owners and representatives of European states had been constantly pressuring the Ottoman central bureaucracy to use foreign loans as a solution to economic problems (Yıldız, 2007, p. 119).

European imperialist countries had the opportunity to market their commercial goods, which increased with mass production, in the Ottoman country, as well as to utilize their increasing cash capital in the Ottoman country. The Ottoman Empire was already in need of this cash capital as it could not increase state revenues due to its failure to industrialize. As a result, a situation of complementarity and mutual dependence emerged between Europe and the Ottoman Empire in monetary and financial matters (Gürsoy, 2011, p. 26).

The first external borrowing attempt was made by Mustafa Reşit Pasha, the grand vizier of Sultan Abdülmecid. In 1851, the first foreign debt agreement was signed with the justification that even salaries could not be paid, but considering the dangers this would pose, this agreement was terminated by paying a cancellation indemnity (Adiloğlu and Yücel, 2021, p. 70).

Since the Ottoman Empire was in desperate need of cash capital, a period of borrowing and lending between Europe and the Ottomans began, which accelerated and grew in a short time. Even before the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire’s debt to the Galata Bankers had risen to 16 million liras. Europe, where banking or borrowing systems had been developed since the Middle Ages, began to constantly knock on the Ottoman Empire’s door to lend money through its powerful financial centers. While the Crimean War, started in 1853, was continuing, the Ottoman Empire took the first external debt from Britain and France, which it considered as allies, upon the need arising in 1854 (Eser, 2021, p. 43).

From 1838 onwards, the Ottoman trade volume expanded, but the current account deficit increased due to imports rather than exports. In addition to this, there has been a massive inflow of foreign capital into the country. Between 1850 – 1913, at least 166 British companies were established in London to trade, operate mines, open factories, etc. in Turkey. The capital of these companies varies between £10,000 and £1,000,000 (Kurmuş, 2007, p. 69). From 1854 to 1873, when the European economic crisis hit, there was no disruption or irregularity in the inflow of foreign capital into the country. During this period, Britain was in the lead in foreign capital inflows both excluding and including external debt. It should not be forgotten that foreign capital inflows increase external debt (Yıldız, 2007, p. 113-114). In the process leading to the establishment of the General Debts Administration, the increasing inflow of foreign capital into the country through both trade and debt relations was influential.

At the outbreak of the Crimean War with Russia in 1853, the Ottoman Empire’s budget was 7.5 million liras, while the war expenses were estimated to be 18 million liras. For this reason, the Ottoman Empire borrowed 3.3 million Ottoman liras from Palmer & Co and Gold Schmitet Ass. companies with the agreement made on August 24, 1854 (Yüksel, 2020, p. 125). The repayment period of the debt was 33 years, the annual interest rate was 6% and the payment method was the repayment of 1% of the capital each year. The issuance price of the bonds is determined as eighty percent of the nominal value. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire received 2.640.000 Ottoman Liras from this debt. Moreover, it is not possible for the Ottoman Empire to spend this money in line with its own plans. According to the agreement, the Ottoman Empire will use this money for war purposes (Adiloğlu and Yücel, 2021, p. 70-71).

The external debts that would have been used to cover the budget deficits and to repay the debts borrowed became unrecoverable in a very short time. The Ottoman Empire’s method of encumbering budget revenues for bond sales led to the complete destruction of the country’s regular budget revenues. While 17% of budget revenues were used for foreign debt payments in 1863 due to the growing foreign debts, in 1873, 55% of budget revenues were used for this purpose (Eser, 2021, p. 43-44).

The Crimean War, in which European states supported the Ottoman Empire due to their own interests, did not result in an Ottoman victory. The Treaty of Paris signed after the war had consequences against the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the war, new foreign debts were taken on the one hand and European capital began to invest in Ottoman lands on the other. The debts were borrowed at high interest rates, were not used efficiently and thus the debt burden increased (Ünlüönen, 1988, p. 315). Apart from the amount of borrowings and the negative interest rates, the number of borrowings is also striking. Between 1854 – 1874, 15 loans were taken. From 1865 onwards, the amount of loans borrowed increased (Yıldırım, 2001, p. 319). Since the loans taken were not used in areas of activity that would increase production, but in areas such as war expenses, palace expenses, palace construction, navy construction and salary payments, the payments of existing debts were made by borrowing new debts (Kurnaz, 1989, p. 64).

The financial indicators of 1874 clearly show the gravity of the situation: While the Ottoman state budget was 25.104.958 liras, the debt installment to be paid reached 30 million liras (Fişek, 1967, p. 160). The Ottoman finances were burdened by the debts and interest, and by 1875 even the installments of the debts could no longer be paid.

The state’s budget balance has worsened as a result of debts borrowed at heavy interest rates that could not be diverted to resource-generating areas. Under Abdülhamid II, on October 30, 1875, a plan for the bankruptcy of the finances and the payment of debts was announced with the Ramadan Law Decree, and it was declared that half of the principal and interest of domestic and foreign debts would not be paid. This announcement was in a sense an admission of a situation that could be called financial bankruptcy or moratorium. As of April 1876, debt repayments were completely suspended. The Ramadan Law caused a great reaction among creditor states. The announcement of the bankruptcy came as a shock to holders of Ottoman bonds in the capitalist center countries (Aybudak, 2022, p. 677). European newspapers began to publish articles such as „Turks defrauded us, they spent our gold for the sake of luxury“ (Akt. Adiloğlu and Yücel, 2021).

Following the Ramadan Law, one of the most important regulations was the establishment of the Rüsumu Sitte Administration (Six Tax Administration) in 1879 and the allocation of six types of taxes to the Galata Bankers in the country. However, the arrangement drew foreign reaction and a new agreement became inevitable. After negotiations between the British, French, Italian, Austrian and German creditors and the Ottoman Empire, the Duyun-ı Umumiyye (General Debts) Administration, in its full name „Duyun-ı Umumiyye-i Osmaniye Varidat-ı Muhassasa” administration, was established with the agreement signed on November 20, 1881 (28 Muharram 1299). The treaty was referred to as the „Muharram Decree“ because it coincided with the month of Muharram (Adiloğlu and Yücel, 2021, p. 73). Evaluating the function of the General Debts Administration only in terms of allocating the receivables of creditor states and its effects on the Ottoman budget would not be sufficient. Assessing the period together with the political power balances, crises, conflicts, partnerships of interest, and the economy-politics nexus will create a holistic perspective on the subject. According to Gürsoy, the General Debts Administration was an outpost of European capitalism (Gürsoy, 2011, p. 25). The introduction of a foreign private administration into the state finances led to a structure similar to that observed in colonies (Kartopu, 2012).

The General Debts Administration was composed of seven people. France, Austria, Italy, Germany, the Ottoman Empire and the Galata Bankers were represented by one member each, while the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were represented by a joint member. The General Debts Administration was authorized to collect and spend the taxes levied by the Ottoman Empire on salt, alcoholic beverages, fisheries, silk, tobacco, and the stamp tax (Adiloğlu and Yücel, 2021, p. 73). In this sense, this meant the privatization of the state, and as a result, the economic life of the country came under the domination of colonial capitalist countries (Eser, 2021, p. 45).

The establishment of the General Debts Administration should be considered in the political context of the period. In 1878, at the Berlin Congress, countries such as Britain, France and Russia, which had lent money to the country, agreed that the Ottoman Empire should be divided. In the period following the Congress, the General Debts Administration, which provided the process of sharing the country economically, if not territorially, emerged as the most important tool of the capitalist exploitation method (Eser, 2021, p. 44-45).

Financial institutions such as the Ottoman Bank and Deutsche Bank were also instrumental in the entry and mobility of Western capitalism into the Ottoman Empire. For example, Deutsche Bank undertook to sell a new Ottoman debt on the German stock exchanges in order to accelerate the granting of railways concessions. Therefore, the German-French rivalry in the period leading up to the First World War was largely in the form of the Deutsche Bank-Osmanlı Bank rivalry. It is not surprising that after railways, banking is the second largest area of investment. The share of banking in the sector in 1914 was 12% (Yıldız, 2007, p. 123-124).

The most important function of the General Debts Administration, which weakened the economic independence of the state, was to control one-fourth of the state revenues. To understand the effectiveness of the organization in the state, it may also be useful to look at the number of employees. While the number of employees of the Ottoman Finance Administration in 1912 was 5,500, the number of personnel employed by the General Debts Administration reached 8,900, including 3,200 temporary and 5,700 permanent positions. (Adiloğlu and Yücel, 2021, s. 74).

During the years of the establishment of the General Debts Administration, there was an increase in foreign capital investments entering the country. In this respect, General Debts Administration is similar to the Balta Liman Trade Treaty. The total amount of foreign capital investments that entered the country between 1888 and 1896 exceeded 30 million pounds sterling. This amount corresponds to 40% of the total foreign capital investments made until 1914. During this period, more than £17 million of foreign capital was invested (Yıldız, 2007, p. 122-123).

With this administration, the Ottoman Empire was economically under the control of foreign countries, and some states increased their political influence within the empire and ensured that decisions were taken in line with their own interests (Dayar and Küçükaksoy, 2009, p. 34). The fact that the General Debts Administration has the power to seize assets for collection when necessary is an indication of a partial loss of sovereign independence. The General Debts Administration limited the authority of the Ottoman Empire to use and allocate its own resources and undermined its sovereign rights. The institution had effects on the Ottoman Empire beyond its own structure and function. The fact that the members of the board of directors of the General Debts Administration also held positions in various companies investing in the Ottoman Empire, such as railways, created relations of interest and contradictions. Besides, an intelligence network was created that controlled the independence of the country with its officers working in places such as railways, ports, post and telephone administration (Adiloğlu and Yücel, 2021, p. 75). Furthermore, this intelligence network was established not only by their own appointed administrators, but also by Ottoman statesmen. A high official, perhaps a minister, who signed his signature as „British“ saw no harm in reporting even the most confidential parts of the meetings of the Council of Ministers to the British ambassador in regular reports (Kurmuş, 2007, p. 72).

The Ottoman Empire, which took the developments in the West as an example for the first time in the eighteenth century, tried to become a part of European politics from the beginning of the 19th century and wanted to avoid being a target in the Eastern Question projection of Europeans. The European political plane, to which the Ottoman Empire tried to join at the expense of making concessions, kept the Ottoman Empire, which was at the bottom, outside the plane as an expected result of the law of unequal development, made it open to influence in accordance with its interests, and came to the point of sharing the territory of the country when the time came. The Ottoman Empire, still possessing vast and geopolitically critical territories despite its weakened political power, began to fall under the hegemony of Western capitalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Despite the administrative interventions, the high crisis level of the Ottoman Empire’s situation made the option of collapse dominant. European capitalism also managed to implement its own interests through the Ottoman service sector. The Ottoman Empire borrowed a lot of money for the construction of railways, which it badly needed for military and administrative reasons. Besides the weight of external debt, he assured the companies of revenue per kilometer in the contracts he signed in railway construction. The General Debts Administration, which played a role in mitigating the risks of foreign railway investments, was a reliable institution for international capital investments (Ergüder, 2020, p. 470). In case the companies that built the railways incurred losses, these losses were paid by the national treasury. The General Debts Administration provided guarantees to the companies that requested assurance for the payment of the remaining amount. This situation has given the General Debts Administration the characteristic of being an institution above the state. The country was looted with a new type of colonialism through these foreign-funded companies that functioned autonomously like a state over the state. Railway construction was mainly based on the proposals and demands of foreign capital investors. This is because the materials needed for the construction of railways were imported from the investing country. After the construction of the railways, the same European countries entered the region with their economic and commercial capital and started to increase the production of raw materials and foodstuffs for export. This means a transfer of income from the periphery to the center (Yıldız, 2007, p. 120). It can be seen that a significant portion of foreign capital investments are focused on railways. The railways sector’s share of the total is approximately 63.1% (Yıldız, 2007, p. 123). The reason why foreign capital preferred the construction and operation of railways more was both the coverage of possible operating losses by the Ottoman treasury and the concessions granted to the companies, such as the right to operate the mines along the route of the railways.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Ambassador to Istanbul, delivered a speech at the groundbreaking ceremony of the Alsancak station on November 16, 1858, which clearly reveals the purpose of foreign capital’s entry and activities in the Ottoman Empire:

“We hope that this railway would be a useful capital investment to facilitate the entry of our industrial products into Turkey. As you all know, Europe has more than ever an interest in the revitalization of Turkey. Western civilization has arrived at the gates of the Levant. I want everyone to know that if these gates, which we have not been able to pass through so far, do not open wide, we have the power, and even more power, to open them by force, in our own interests, and to impose our will.” (Kurmuş, 2007, p.55).

As can be seen, the General Debts Administration was not established with the innocent intention of putting the Ottoman budget structure in order and paying off its foreign debts. The establishment and operational objectives of the General Debts Administration can be summarized as follows:

1.To organize the Ottoman economy according to the interests of creditor states,
2. To provide intelligence to European states on strategic areas (railroads, ports, post, telephone, etc.) concerning the Ottoman economy, institutional structure and the independence of the country,
3. To export raw materials and resources, especially of strategic importance, from the Ottoman lands,
4. To have the right to manage the commercial enterprises of the Ottoman Empire,
5. To transfer money from the Ottoman treasury to their own coffers by means other than debt collection.

The existence of the General Debts Administration did not prevent the Ottoman Empire from acquiring new foreign debts. In the 27 years between 1881, when the General Debts Administration was established, and 1908, when the II. Constitutional Monarchy was proclaimed, 63 million Ottoman Liras were borrowed in 16 different loans. In the following years, another 46 million Ottoman Liras were borrowed in 8 different loans until the First World War in 1914. Some of the 63 million lira borrowings were used for the construction of the Eastern Railways, some for military expenditures, some for the restructuring of old debts, and some for the closure of budget deficits. Because of the high cost of the Tripoli and Balkan Wars, the 22 million Ottoman Liras loan taken from the Ottoman Bank in 1914 was the last stabilization of this long borrowing adventure.

The Ottoman Empire lost its territories outside Anatolia as a result of the First World War, and the Entente Powers tried to condemn it to the Sevres Peace Treaty. The independence struggle that started with the Kuvayi Milliye (National Forces) resistance in Anatolia evolved into the National Struggle (War of Independence) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the new Turkish state was built at the end of three years. The Lausanne Peace Treaty (July 24, 1923), which was the deed of the new state, divided the foreign debts left over from the Ottoman Empire among the states that emerged within the borders of the empire, and tied the part related to Turkey to installments. During the peace negotiations, the creditor states wanted the debt to be paid in gold or sterling, but it was decided to pay the debt in Turkish currency or francs, as requested by the Turkish representatives (Kili, 2006, p. 149). As a compromise was reached on the payment of foreign debts, the General Debts Administration was closed. In this way, the General Debts Administration, which had assumed the role of a control mechanism over Turkish finance, the Turkish economy and even Turkish politics, and which operated with the logic of a „state over the state“, disappeared. The Republic of Turkey completed the repayment of its Ottoman foreign debt in 1954.

In contemporary world economies, many countries are struggling with very large deficits in their budgets. Bütçe açıkları ile mücadele etme yöntemi olarak birçok ülke borçlanmayı seçtiğinden bu ülkelerin borç yüklerinin de günden güne arttığı gözlemlenmektedir (Eser, 2021, s. 26). Today, the evaluation of the relationship between external indebtedness and economic dependence of countries, in other words, the relationship of undermining economic independence through indebtedness, and the similarities between General Debts Administration and today’s institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank should be addressed as the subject of another article with their historical contexts.

1 In accordance with the principle of provisionism, it was desired that the goods produced in order to meet the needs of the cities should be cheap, abundant and at the same time of high quality and that production should be at high levels (Çetin, 2018, p. 236).

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