Doç. Dr. Fatih Yaşlı
Akademisyen/Yazar
The title of my article published in this journal last year was “De-electoralization: A Key Concept for Understanding Contemporary Türkiye.” As a concept, “de-electoralization” referred to a situation in which free elections were not officially abolished, but the ruling party effectively rendered the ballot box useless, exerted immense pressure on the opposition, and prevented its rivals from participating in elections.
This process, initiated on March 19, 2025, with the arrest and imprisonment of Ekrem Imamoglu, the Mayor of Istanbul and the presidential candidate of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), is still ongoing. Almost a year has passed, yet the trials have only just begun, and İmamoğlu has spent this time in a high-security prison, largely in isolation. Meanwhile, new lawsuits and investigations were launched against him.
But it didn’t stop with İmamoğlu. Over the past month, the mayor of Kuşadası, one of Türkiye’s most important tourist districts, the mayors of the provinces of Bolu and Uşak, and, most recently, the mayor of Bursa, a historic and significant city, have been arrested on corruption charges. What
all these mayors had in common was that they were members of the CHP and had won the most recent local elections.
Last year, following March 19, there was a massive public backlash against the process of dismantling the electoral system; protesters, led by university students, filled the streets, and the protests caused significant discomfort for the government. However, a short time later, the protests came to an end due to both government pressure and the opposition’s unwillingness to continue, which provided the government with some relief.
There was no serious public reaction against the arrests that took place over the last month; the student move- ment failed to regroup, no large-scale protests were organized, the government’s operations became almost routine, and they retained their place on the agenda to a lesser extent.
Another tool the ruling party is planning to use in the de-electoralization process is to have the CHP’s congress held three years ago annulled through the courts and to hand the party back to its former leadership. The ruling party is thus aiming to split the opposition, create a chaotic process, and prevent the opposition from fielding a single candidate against Erdoğan. The legal proceedings regarding this matter are ongoing, and there is widespread speculation that the court may make a decision in line with the ruling party’s wishes.
However, none of this means that the vast majority of the Turkish public is satisfied with the current government and its policies. After winning the 2023 elections, the government launched a new austerity program in the name of fighting inflation, yet despite nearly three years having passed since the program began, inflation has only been reduced by four percentage points.
Furthermore, inflation has different impacts on different revenue groups; while high-income groups are less impacted by inflation, the rapid rise in
food inflation is having an extremely negative effect on low-income groups, leading to the deepening and widening of poverty.
However, as workers‘ and civil servants‘ unions in Türkiye are weak and the unionization rate among the working class is low, there is no organized
response to the ongoing economic crisis. Neither the CHP, a party that we could describe as social democratic, nor the socialist parties, which are
weak players in Turkish politics, are able to politicize the public’s dissatisfaction arising from the crisis.
The ruling party, meanwhile, immediately suppresses any reactions that might arise from the grassroots. For example, Mehmet Türkmen, president of the United Textile, Weaving, and Leather Workers’ Union, one of Türkiye’s most influential textile unions, was arrested for waging an effective struggle. Similarly, Esra Işık, who led villagers defending their lands against a mining company in İkizköy in the Aegean Region, has also been arrested.
In this period of intense pressure on social opposition, the CHP appears to have defined its entire strategy around elections and the ballot box. The ruling party’s policies of de-electoralization are being accepted, and while there are constant calls for early elections, these calls do not carry enough pressure to force the government to hold elections. As a result, the government has effectively closed the door on elections.
The CHP, meanwhile, has put the idea of holding a midterm election on its agenda as a way to open the door to early general elections. Currently, there are 8 vacant seats in the Turkish parliament; if 22 deputies from the CHP resign, leaving 30 seats vacant, a midterm election must be held. How- ever, this requires a decision passed by a simple majority in parliament. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), control the majority in parliament and could thwart the CHP’s plan to call for elections by refusing to accept any resignations, even if they were offered.
The CHP wants to turn the midterm elections into a kind of referendum, a kind of preliminary election, but it is clear that the ruling coalition will not go along with this. Under such circumstances, the CHP intends to accuse the ruling coalition of trying to avoid the election and not complying with the will of the people, and to use this narrative in the election scheduled for 2027.
The ruling party had planned to hold the elections at the end of 2027, believing it would be able to see the results of the economic policies it has pursued so far. However, with the Iran war, it has become clear that the economic program, which was already far from its targets, will not be able to achieve its goals. There is no possibility of inflation falling significantly in Turkiye in the near future, which will mean a further rise in poverty and a growing sense of discontent.
For this very reason, the ruling party, which is increasingly struggling to secure social consent and establish hegemony, may resort to greater coercion and force, intensify pressure on the opposition, and unexpectedly call for elections, thereby ensuring that Erdoğan retains his seat for at least one more term. In addition to its harsh policies, the government could abandon its austerity program and implement significant pay raises for workers, civil servants, and retirees, offer low-interest loans, and write off debts.
It can be said that politics in Türkiye is currently at a standstill, in a state of deadlock. The ruling party cannot take a step forward, but the opposition cannot force the ruling party to back down either. Likewise, the opposition is unable to move forward, but it is not backing down either. It remains unclear how this stalemate will be resolved, and which side will make the necessary moves. After a brief summer break from politics, it may become slightly easier to predict the direction things will take come fall, at which point it may become possible to make more sound assessments and accurate predictions. For now, therefore, we are all continuing to watch this stalemate.
