Dr. Günal Kurşun
PhD, Penal Law; Member
of Board, Amnesty International Turkish Section

Relocation from New York, the Case for Strengthening
Geneva as a De Facto Sec- ond Hub, and the Politics of Visa/Access

Abstract

The United Nations Headquarters in New York is not merely a physical site but a political and legal infrastructure shaping access, legitimacy, and the everyday ecology of diplomacy. This article evaluates whether relocating the UN ‘seat’ away from New York is feasible in the short to medium term, and it maps the principal arguments for and against relocation. It then advances a more plausible institutional pathway: strengthening Geneva (UNOG) as a de facto second hub to enhance resilience and reduce exposure to host state leverage, especially in visa and access disputes. The discussion is grounded in the 1947 UN–US Headquarters Agreement and in the 2025 episode in which Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was unable to obtain a US visa and the General Assembly authorized a video address.

Keywords

United Nations; headquarters; host state; Headquarters Agreement; Geneva; UNOG; visa denial; venue politics; multilateralism

1. Introduction

Debates about moving the UN Headquarters often appear, at first glance, to be questions of logistics and real estate. Yet the location of a global organization’s ‘seat’ is also a question of power: who can enter, who can speak, and how the host state’s legal and political choices interact with the Organization’s claim to universality. In the UN context, the host state’s ability to shape access through visas and transit rules periodically brings the geography of multilateralism into sharp focus[1].

This article asks three questions. First, is relocating the UN seat away from New York legally and politically plausible in the short to medium term? Second, what are the strongest arguments for and against relocation? Third, if full relocation is improbable, can Geneva be strengthened as a de facto second hub—an institutional ‘insurance policy’ that lowers the Organization’s vulnerability to host state leverage while preserving the advantages of New York’s diplomatic ecosystem?

The analysis pays particular attention to the politics of visa and access disputes, using the 2025 episode in which Mahmoud Abbas was unable to obtain a US visa and the General Assembly authorized a video address as a contemporary case study[2].

2. Legal and Institutional Background: Why the Seat Can Change—And Why It Rarely Does

The UN Charter does not permanently ‘lock’ the Organization into New York. The Headquarters’ legal foundation rests largely on the 1947 UN–US Headquarters Agreement and related practice.  In principle, therefore, a change of seat is not inconceivable. In practice, however, the New York seat is deeply entrenched by decades of institutional infrastructure, legal arrangements, and diplomatic routines that are costly to replicate elsewhere[3].

The Headquarters Agreement sets out a baseline expectation of non-interference with transit to and from the Headquarters District for representatives of Member States and other authorized persons.  At the same time, recurring disputes and periodic controversies highlight the tension between the Agreement’s logic and the host state’s political discretion[4], especially when geopolitics is polarized[5].

The General Assembly’s Committee on Relations with the Host Country provides a standing forum for tracking and negotiating such issues, including visa and access concerns, which makes host state relations a continuing institutional agenda rather than an episodic anomaly[6].

3. Arguments in Favour of Relocation

3.1. Institutional legitimacy and the perception of independence

The UN’s symbolic and practical dependence on the territory of a major power invites recurring critiques about institutional independence. Even when the Organization operates autonomously, perceptions matter. Relocation—or even partial rebalancing—can be framed as a legitimacy-enhancing move that underscores universality and reduces the appearance of host-state political shadowing.

3.2. Access, inclusivity, and resilience against visa/transit leverage

Visa denials and restrictions pose a direct challenge to the idea that UN forums are universally accessible to Member States. When a host state’s decisions prevent participation, the Organization is forced into ad hoc workarounds—video statements, delegation substitutions, or procedural compromises—that may mitigate immediate disruption but raise longer-term concerns about equal participation. The 2025 Abbas episode is frequently cited as an illustration[7].

3.3. Continuity planning and reduced single-point dependency

Global institutions face systemic shocks—pandemics, large-scale security incidents, and infrastructure disruptions. A governance architecture heavily concentrated in one city increases operational risk. A relocation debate is often a proxy for a broader resilience agenda: building redundancy and continuity across multiple hubs.

4. Arguments Against Relocation

4.1. The political threshold: achieving consensus in a plural world

Relocation is not a technical adjustment but a geopolitical choice. Member States may accept the critique of host-state leverage while disagreeing sharply about the alternative venue. The ‘where to?’ question can itself become a new axis of contention, especially where major contributors and permanent Security Council members hold decisive influence over feasibility.

4.2. Legal, administrative, and financial switching costs

The New York seat is underwritten by a mature legal regime—privileges and immunities, security arrangements, communications infrastructure, and a dense network of permanent missions and support services. Recreating this in another country would require a comprehensive new ‘seat agreement’ and a lengthy transition period with significant dual-running costs[8].

4.3. Losing the New York diplomatic ecosystem

New York is not only a meeting location; it is a diplomatic ecology. Informal interactions, dense scheduling, and the city’s surrounding networks (media, civil society, permanent missions) contribute to the UN’s everyday functioning. A full relocation risks eroding that ‘thick’ ecosystem, at least for a prolonged transition period.

5. Strengthening Geneva as a De Facto Second Hub

If a formal seat change is improbable in the short to medium term, a more realistic pathway is to strengthen Geneva’s role within a deliberately multi-hub UN. Geneva’s UN Office (UNOG) is not merely a regional outpost; it is a major operational and conferencing centre with extensive infrastructure and a long-standing diplomatic ecosystem.

UNOG’s scale and capacity are substantial. UN Geneva reports hosting roughly 8,000 meetings annually, with 34 conference rooms and over 9,200 seats across its main facilities.  These figures matter because they demonstrate that Geneva can absorb additional high-level and technical functions without the ‘greenfield’ investment that a brand-new seat would require[9].

A functional division of labour is plausible: New York remains the primary stage for General Assembly political moments and high-level week, while Geneva takes on a more systematically expanded share of human rights, humanitarian, and technical governance work—alongside selected Secretariat functions that benefit from proximity to the ‘International Geneva’ ecosystem. This is not a symbolic compromise but an operational strategy to create redundancy.

6. Visa and Access Disputes as a Stress Test: The 2025 Palestine Case

Host state obligations become most visible when they are contested. In 2025, reports indicated that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas could not obtain a US visa to travel to New York for the General Assembly’s high-level segment, prompting the General Assembly to authorize a video address[10].  The episode triggered debate about whether such restrictions align with the spirit and requirements of the Headquarters Agreement, and it renewed calls—at least in public commentary—for relocating certain UN meetings to Geneva[11].

The institutional significance of this episode is threefold. First, it illustrates how host state decisions can affect participation in the UN’s most visible forum. Second, it shows the limits of ‘workarounds’: video participation may solve an immediate procedural problem, but if normalized, it risks transforming unequal physical access into an accepted feature of multilateralism. Third, the case strengthens the argument for building credible alternative venues in advance rather than improvising in each crisis. In this sense, Geneva’s capacity is not merely convenient—it can serve as a structural safeguard.

Historically, the UN has faced similar controversies. The 1988 dispute surrounding the denial of a visa to Yasser Arafat was widely discussed in legal scholarship and contributed to renewed attention to the possibility of holding certain General Assembly meetings outside New York.  The pattern is consistent: access controversies repeatedly re-open the question of whether a single-city seat is compatible with universal participation[12].

7. Conclusion

A full relocation of the UN seat from New York is legally conceivable but, in the short to medium term, politically and financially unlikely. The strongest arguments for relocation—independence, universality, and resilience against host-state leverage—must be weighed against entrenched legal regimes, ecosystem losses, and the steep consensus threshold.

A more plausible institutional strategy is to strengthen Geneva as a de facto second hub. UNOG’s existing capacity and the broader International Geneva ecosystem make it uniquely positioned to take on an expanded share of UN work. Viewed through the lens of visa and access disputes—such as the 2025 Abbas episode—this is not simply an efficiency argument but a legitimacy and continuity argument: a multi-hub UN reduces the risk that host state politics will determine who can participate in global governance.

Policy-wise, three steps follow: (1) allocate a predictable share of high-level thematic meetings to Geneva; (2) develop a standing protocol for visa/access disputes, including venue and format alternatives; and (3) embed Geneva’s reinforcement within a broader multi-hub approach that also strengthens other duty stations, to avoid the perception of merely ‘moving within the West’.

* PhD, Penal Law; Member of Board, Amnesty International Turkish Section

[1] Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (UN–US Headquarters Agreement), 26 June 1947 (entered into force 21 Nov 1947), UNTS Vol. 11, No. 147; see especially provisions on access/transit to the Headquarters District. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2011/volume-11-I-147-English.pdf

[2] Associated Press, ‘UN votes to let Palestinian leader address General Assembly by video after US visa denial’ (19 Sept 2025). https://apnews.com/article/aa45c5e27dad591b33d04cf24377ebd9

[3] UN–US Headquarters Agreement (1947), cited in footnote 1.

[4] See, e.g., S. Reza, ‘Dispute Over the United States’ Denial of a Visa to Yasir Arafat’ (1989), Boston University Law Faculty Scholarship. https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/3577

[5] UN–US Headquarters Agreement (1947), Article IV (e.g., Section 11) on transit to and from the Headquarters District.

[6] UN General Assembly, Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country (example: A/74/26) and successor reports, documenting recurring issues including visas and access. https://docs.un.org/en/A/74/26

[7] Associated Press, ‘UN votes to let Palestinian leader address General Assembly by video after US visa denial’ (19 Sept 2025). https://apnews.com/article/aa45c5e27dad591b33d04cf24377ebd9

[8] Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (UN–US Headquarters Agreement), 26 June 1947 (entered into force 21 Nov 1947), UNTS Vol. 11, No. 147. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2011/volume-11-I-147-English.pdf

[9] UN Office at Geneva (UNOG), ‘Conference rooms’ (meeting volume and room/seat capacity). https://www.ungeneva.org/en/meetings-events/rooms

[10] Associated Press, ‘UN votes to let Palestinian leader address General Assembly by video after US visa denial’ (19 Sept 2025). https://apnews.com/article/aa45c5e27dad591b33d04cf24377ebd9

[11] The Guardian, ‘US visa refusal for Palestinian delegation prompts calls to move UN meeting to Geneva’ (8 Sept 2025). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/08/us-visa-refusal-for-palestinian-delegation-prompts-calls-to-move-un-meeting-to-geneva

[12] Y.Z. Blum, ‘U.N. General Assembly Meetings Held Outside New York’ (1989), Michigan Journal of International Law. https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol10/iss3/1/